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DISCUSSION
Defining and identifying 
threats – a new challenge 
to old assumptions in the 
theory and practice of 
emergency and security 
law
A reply to Jens Kremer
Jens Kremer raises a problem that is well known in the 
theory of security and emergency law. Since issues of 
security are so complex, and often so political, legal 
institutions, and especially courts, are not prepared to make 

Page 1 of 6Defining and identifying threats – a new challenge to old assumptions in the theory an...
06.01.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/defining-and-identifying-threats-a-new-challenge-to-old-...
decisions on them, the consequence being that courts, 
overwhelmingly take officials’ security-claims for granted. 
To tackle the problem, Kremer suggests we can use new 
tools and new concepts, especially Bruce Schneier’s idea of 
security mindsets, recognizing that ‘security’ is driven by 
different professional and institutional attitudes – and with 
them different sensitivities and capacities to identify 
breaches of security. Security is not a fixed concept but is 
always located in a particular mindset. If courts can identify 
the specific security mindset at stake, they can make better 
choices in matters of security.
What Kremer doesn’t explain is why should we expect that 
judges, who are used to deference on security claims, would 
adopt a critical security mindset perspective. Don’t they 
know already that security has many minds, and meanings 
and that it is not a fixed concept? Of course they do – see for 
example Lord Bingham’s famous words in A and Others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department: ‘Any prediction 
about the future behavior of human beings (as oppose to the 
phases of the moon or high water at London Bridge), is 
necessarily problematical. Reasonable and informed minds 
may differ, and a judgment is not shown wrong or 
unreasonable because that which is thought likely to happen 
doesn’t happen. It would be irresponsible not to err, if at all, 
on the side of safety’ (Para. 29). In other words judges do see 
that security is a complex and unstable concept, they just 
don’t see themselves institutionally fit to deal with it and 
choose to defer to state officials who are more ‘security 
minded’.
Assuming indefinability
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I believe there is a deeper reason for judges’ institutional 
unwillingness to decide on security matters, a reason that is 
tied to the background theory and doctrine in this field.
Traditionally, emergency and security law theoreticians are 
deeply uninterested in the problem of defining and 
identifying specific threats. They work, in fact, under a 
strong assumption that emergencies are inherently difficult 
to define. This is also how they frame the field’s problematic 
– while there is a clear need to define situations in which 
security measures may be invoked (because of the vast 
scope of the powers that they call for) the term ’emergency’ 
or ‘security’ is ‘by its nature an elastic concept which may 
defy precise definition’ (Gross and Ni Aolain, Law in Times of 
Crisis at 5, citing a wide variety of authorities: scholars, 
colonial and postcolonial jurisprudence (Ningkan v. 
Government of Malaysia (1970) A.C. 379 at 390), and 
international law instruments; even more famously, see Carl 
Schmitt’s definition of emergency, as a situation which 
‘cannot be circumscribed factually’, ‘cannot be codified in 
the existing order’; it is the ultimate unknowable, an ‘other’, 
the exception).
This clear cut common assumption about the indefinability 
of threats should not come as a surprise – if indeed threats 
are so hard to define, theoreticians of emergency law can 
freely engage with what interests them most: in the critical 
legal tradition, under the influence of Carl Schmitt, it is the 
borderline concept of ‘the exception’. In the legal pragmatic 
tradition influenced by the American Framers, it is the 
construction of an all-powerful mechanism that can manage 
threats of all kind. The real problem of defining the precise 
nature of security, emergency, disasters and so on, is 
resisted by a strong attachment to the grand political 
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projects of containing all imaginable and unimaginable 
threats.
The limits of indefinability
But the assumption that threats are inherently indefinable is 
highly problematic and misleading. First, it entrenches in 
positive law and practice a static and dichotic politics that 
constantly reaffirms itself – if threats defy precise 
definitions someone must be appointed to decide that they 
exist – the executive, most prominently. All regularly capable 
agents of a given polity – courts, legislators, civil society 
organizations, the media, and local authorities just to name a 
few – must defer to his decision.
But even more problematic, the strong assumption that 
threats are inherently indefinable overshadows, hides and 
obscures a set of crucially important questions about the 
nature of the process or multiple processes in which threats 
are actually defined, detected and declared. These are 
questions and debates about the nature of a specific threat, 
like that of terrorism, about the proper process of identifying
it, about proper methods and procedures of identification, 
about the amount and type of evidence required, about 
standards of overview and review of such processes, about 
the spaces and places for contestation over identification and 
declaration of threats and the actors involved in them. These 
questions call for, and bring about, an alternative politics of 
definitions, an alternative picture of multiple perspectives 
and competing claims which rather than prove that threats 
are ‘indefinable’, show why they call for problematization, 
contestation and debate. Lifting the well-entrenched veil of 
‘indefinability’, by stressing the practical problems that the 
process of definition and identification raise, and expanding 
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the resources that exist to confront them, is necessary if we 
want to move forward in our understanding of security and 
in managing threats.
Karin Loevy is a research scholar at the New York University 
School of Law and the Coordinator of its JSD Program. The 
topics here addressed are dealt with at length in the third 
chapter of her doctoral thesis “From Exception to 
Containment: On the Dynamic Legal Politics of Emergency 
Powers”.
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